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OPINION OF THE COURT 
   
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This is a consolidated criminal appeal, arising out of a 
large tax fraud conspiracy, that presents us with an 
opportunity to clarify the mental states required of the payor 
and payee to uphold a conviction for Hobbs Act extortion 
under color of official right.  For the reasons set forth below, 
we will affirm.1 
I. Background 
 Between 2007 and 2012, Appellant Patricia Fountain, 
an IRS employee, helped orchestrate several schemes to 
fraudulently obtain cash refunds from the IRS.  Those 
schemes involved filing false tax returns that claimed refunds 
pursuant to the Telephone Excise Tax Refund (“TETR”), the 
First Time Home Buyer Credit (“FTHBC”), or the American 
Opportunity Tax Credit (“AOTC”).  Fountain employed her 
knowledge of the IRS’s fraud detection procedures to avoid 
suspicion, including that TETR claims below $1,500 would 
not be flagged for review.  Over time, Fountain and her 
significant other, Appellant Larry Ishmael, enlisted various 
people, including Appellant Calvin Johnson, Jr., to recruit 
                                              
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
4 
 
claimants who would provide their personal information in 
exchange for a portion of a cash refund.  During the same 
period, Johnson became involved in an additional conspiracy 
with some of his family members and other acquaintances 
that involved submitting fraudulent FTHBC and AOTC 
claims.   
 After a two-week trial, a jury convicted Fountain, 
Ishmael, and Johnson on multiple counts of conspiracy and 
filing false claims to the IRS in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 286 
and 287.  Fountain was also convicted on one count of Hobbs 
Act Extortion and two counts of making or presenting false 
tax returns, violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and 26 U.S.C. § 
7206, respectively.  Additionally, Johnson was convicted of 
filing false claims to the IRS while on pretrial release in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 287 and 3147(1).   
 Fountain moved for a judgment of acquittal after trial 
on the Hobbs Act charge, which the District Court denied.  
Following evidentiary hearings on the dollar amounts 
involved in the Defendants’ schemes, the District Court 
sentenced Fountain to 228 months’ imprisonment and a three-
year term of supervised release, and ordered her to pay 
restitution of $1,740,221.40.  The District Court sentenced 
Ishmael to 144 months’ imprisonment and a three-year term 
of supervised release, and ordered him to pay restitution of 
$1,751,809.40.  Finally, the District Court sentenced Johnson 
to 216 months’ imprisonment and a three-year term of 
supervised release, and ordered him to pay restitution of 
$1,248,392.40.  Each of these sentences fell within the 
applicable Guidelines ranges after the District Judge imposed 
various enhancements. 
II. Discussion 
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 A. Fountain’s Hobbs Act Conviction 
 Fountain contends that the evidence at trial was 
insufficient to support a conviction for extortion under color 
of official right.  While sufficiency of the evidence is a 
question of law subject to plenary review, “[w]e review ‘the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government,’ 
afford ‘deference to a jury’s findings,’ and draw ‘all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the jury verdict.’”  United 
States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 206 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 329 (3d Cir. 2010)).  We 
will overturn the verdict “only when the record contains no 
evidence, regardless of how it is weighted, from which the 
jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. (quoting 
Riley, 621 F.3d at 329) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 The extortion count against Fountain alleged that she 
obtained and attempted to obtain money from Deborah 
Alexander under color of official right as an IRS employee.  
As the Government demonstrated at trial, Alexander was a 
client at Natashia Witherspoon’s hair salon.  Witherspoon, 
who was also Fountain’s hairstylist, recruited Alexander and 
other clients to provide personal information so that Fountain 
could file fraudulent tax returns in their names.  Witherspoon 
had Alexander fill out blank IRS forms with her personal 
information and then gave those forms to Fountain for her to 
file.  Alexander never dealt directly with Fountain, but she 
knew Fountain worked for the IRS.  Sometime after her tax 
return was filed, Witherspoon told her that she had to pay 
Fountain a $400 fee.  Alexander testified that she became 
suspicious, but paid the fee anyway.  Witherspoon testified 
that she told some people that Fountain would “red flag” 
them if they did not pay her fee, but did not say whether she 
conveyed that information to Alexander in particular.  
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Likewise, Alexander did not recall Witherspoon mentioning 
any consequences for failing to make the payment.  
 We hold that the evidence adduced at trial was 
sufficient to support Fountain’s Hobbs Act conviction.  
Because we have articulated the appropriate standard for an 
official right extortion conviction in varying ways in past 
cases, we take this opportunity to synthesize our case law and 
explain how we come to this result.   
  1. Elements of Hobbs Act Extortion  
   Under Color of Official Right   
 The federal statute penalizing extortion, 18 U.S.C. § 
1951, a codification of the 1946 Hobbs Act, provides that: 
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, 
delays, or affects commerce or the movement of 
any article or commodity in commerce, by 
robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so 
to do, or commits or threatens physical violence 
to any person or property in furtherance of a 
plan or purpose to do anything in violation of 
this section shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.  
 
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).  Extortion is defined as “the obtaining of 
property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful 
use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under 
color of official right.”  Id. § 1951(b)(2).  As we explained in 
United States v. Manzo, 636 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2011): 
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Congress sought to proscribe coercive activity 
through enactment of the Hobbs Act.  Under the 
terms of the Hobbs Act, a person can only 
commit extortion in one of two ways: (1) 
through threatened force, violence or fear or (2) 
under color of official right.  See 18 U.S.C. § 
1951(b)(2).  Both of these types of extortion are 
inherently coercive. 
 
Id. at 65.   
 Whereas in a case of extortion by force, violence, or 
fear, the acts or threats supply the coercion, “when 
proceeding under a ‘color of official right’ theory, the ‘misuse 
of public office is said to supply the element of coercion.’”  
Id. (quoting United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 393 
(1st Cir. 1976)); see also Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 
255, 266 (1992) (adopting the majority rule that “the coercive 
element” of Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right 
“is provided by the public office itself”).  In other words, the 
importance of a defendant’s public office or official act to a 
Hobbs Act charge is its coercive effect on the payor.  
Accordingly, after reviewing the legislative history and 
evaluating competing constructions of the statute, the 
Supreme Court held in Evans that to prove a conviction for 
extortion under color of official right, “the Government need 
only show that a public official has obtained a payment to 
which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was 
made in return for official acts.”  504 U.S. at 268.   
 We interpreted Evans in United States v. Antico, 275 
F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 2001), and explained that “no ‘official act’ . 
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. . need be proved to convict under the Hobbs Act.”  Id. at 
257.  Rather, we focus on (1) the motivation of the payor, that 
is, whether a payment “was made in return for official acts,” 
and (2) whether the defendant knew the payor’s motivation.  
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Evans, 504 U.S. at 268) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  As such, in Antico, we 
approved a district court’s instruction that the jury had to 
decide “whether the giver gave the payments . . . because he 
believed the defendant would use his office for acts not 
properly related to his official duty.”  Id. at 259 (underline 
added).  Similarly, in United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754 
(3d Cir. 2005), we upheld a Hobbs Act conviction where the 
government adduced substantial evidence that (1) the payors 
made payments to the defendants knowing they were “public 
officials exercising governmental authority”; (2) the payors 
“made payments in order to assure advantageous exercise of 
that government authority”; and (3) the defendants “knew that 
the [payors’] payments were made for an improper purpose, 
i.e., the influencing of their governmental authority.”  Id. at 
769. 
 In other decisions, however, we have expressly 
identified another consideration in our official right extortion 
inquiry: whether the payor’s belief was reasonable.  This line 
of cases began with our en banc decision in United States v. 
Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1975) (en banc).  There, the 
defendant, a state senator, received payments in exchange for 
helping a corporation obtain a lease from a state executive 
agency.  Id. at 641.  The defendant argued that he could not 
have been acting under color of official right because he “had 
no official power” in that area, and he “never pretended to 
have any official power.”  Id. at 643.  We acknowledged that 
the “defendant had no statutory power as a state senator to 
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control the granting of leases by state executive agencies,” 
but rejected the defendant’s argument, because “in order to 
find that defendant acted ‘under color of official right,’ the 
jury need not have concluded that he had actual de jure power 
to secure grant of the lease so long as it found that [the payor] 
held, and defendant exploited, a reasonable belief that the 
state system so operated that the power in fact of defendant’s 
office included the effective authority to determine recipients 
of the state leases here involved.”  Id.    
 We recently extended Mazzei in United States v. 
Bencivengo, 749 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2014).  There, we upheld a 
Hobbs Act conviction of the Mayor of Hamilton Township, 
New Jersey, who accepted payments in exchange for agreeing 
to influence the awarding of School Board insurance 
contracts.  Id. at 208.  We noted that the defendant “had no 
actual de jure or de facto power over the award” of such 
contracts, and that unlike in Mazzei, there was no evidence 
“that [the payor] believed he had such power.”  Id. at 212.  
Nonetheless, we held that Mazzei extended to situations 
where a payor reasonably believed the defendant possessed 
“influence,” if not “effective power,” over an exercise of 
governmental authority.  Id. at 212-13.  Thus, we concluded, 
“where a public official has, and agrees to wield, influence 
over a governmental decision in exchange for financial gain, 
or where the official’s position could permit such influence, 
and the victim of an extortion scheme reasonably believes that 
the public official wields such influence, that is sufficient to 
sustain a conviction under the Hobbs Act, regardless of 
whether the official holds any de jure or de facto power over 
the decision.”  Id. 
 Read together, our holdings in Mazzei, Antico, Urban, 
and Bencivengo, while emphasizing different aspects of the 
10 
 
payor’s motivation, are consistent in accounting for the 
payor’s reasonable belief as a reflection of the coercive effect 
of the defendant’s official acts.  The reason we included in 
our inquiry the reasonableness of the payor’s belief that the 
defendant would engage in particular “official acts”—
whether by exercising de jure power, de facto power, or 
“influence”—in Mazzei and Bencivengo but not Antico or 
Urban is simple:  The defendant’s authority to engage in the 
relevant “official acts” was not contested in Antico or Urban.  
Both of those cases involved Philadelphia Licenses and 
Inspections officers who accepted illicit payments in 
exchange for favorable exercises of their authority, i.e., they 
rewarded people who paid and punished people who did not.  
See Urban, 404 F.3d at 760-62; Antico, 275 F.3d at 249.2  
Those defendants clearly exercised de jure power over 
governmental decisions.  In contrast, in Mazzei and 
Bencivengo, the defendants’ authority was contested, as 
indicated above.3  But in all of these cases, reasonableness 
was inherent in our inquiry.        
 Thus, our case law articulates a unified standard for 
official right extortion cases:  We will uphold a conviction for 
Hobbs Act extortion where the evidence indicates (1) that the 
payor made a payment to the defendant because the payor 
held a reasonable belief that the defendant would perform 
official acts in return, and (2) that the defendant knew the 
payor made the payment because of that belief.    
                                              
 2 One might refer to these as “classic” official right 
extortion cases. 
 
 3 Fountain raises similar arguments here, as explored 
below.  
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  2.  Application 
 Upon a careful consideration of the record, we agree 
with the District Court that a rational juror could conclude 
that Alexander paid Fountain $400 with the understanding 
that Fountain would use her position at the IRS to help her 
obtain a cash refund, and that Fountain knew that Alexander 
paid her for that reason.  While Fountain may not have had 
any power over the IRS’s decision to grant any of the 
fraudulent refunds she filed, we need not find that Fountain 
actually used her position or performed an official act in 
furtherance of the scheme to uphold her conviction; the focus 
of our inquiry is on Alexander’s state of mind.  See Antico, 
275 F.3d at 257 (“In other words, no ‘official act’ (i.e., no 
‘quo’) need be proved to convict under the Hobbs Act.  
Nonetheless, the official must know that the payment—the 
‘quid’—was made in return for official acts.”); see also 
Urban, 404 F.3d at 768 (“[T]he government need not prove . . 
. that the public official acted or refrained from acting as a 
result of payments made.”).   
 Fountain contends both that Alexander did not 
subjectively believe and that no reasonable person in 
Alexander’s position could have believed that Fountain, a 
customer service representative for the IRS, could influence 
whether she received a refund.  Viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Government, however, the 
evidence at trial allowed the jury to find that Alexander 
reasonably believed Fountain could wield such influence.  It 
is not clear exactly what Alexander understood about 
Fountain’s position, as Alexander interacted only with 
Witherspoon, but as Alexander testified, once her refund 
claim was submitted, she was told she had to pay $400 of the 
refund to Fountain and, despite her suspicions, she acquiesced 
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because she was “still hoping to get the money.”  Fountain’s 
App. 327.  This suggests she understood her $400 payment to 
be compensation for services rendered.  Indeed, when the IRS 
demanded repayment of the refund, Alexander told Fountain 
and Witherspoon, “I want my $400 back, because if I had to 
pay the $1,400 back [to the IRS], I’m not going to give her 
$400.”  Fountain’s App. 318.  On the basis of this evidence, 
the jury easily could have found that Alexander reasonably 
believed Fountain would help her obtain the refund. 
The jury also could have found that Alexander 
reasonably feared reprisal.  Alexander paid Fountain after her 
claim had been submitted and despite her suspicions about 
Fountain’s demand for payment.  Even though neither 
Alexander nor Witherspoon testified to any explicit 
discussion with Alexander about the consequences of failing 
to pay, Witherspoon did testify generally that Fountain 
threatened to “red flag” claimants who did not pay her fee and 
that she repeated Fountain’s warning to claimants.  Fountain’s 
App. 265-66.  Thus, a reasonable inference from the 
testimony, as well as the timing of the payment, is that 
Alexander paid Fountain because she was concerned that 
Fountain, as an IRS employee, otherwise would have 
prevented the refund or flagged it to a superior for suspected 
fraud.4 
 Finally, we reject Fountain’s argument that the 
evidence in support of the Hobbs Act charge was insufficient 
because the Government failed to prove that she used the 
                                              
 4 Indeed, the Government demonstrated that Fountain 
did submit amended returns for claimants who ultimately 
failed to pay, leading the IRS to reclaim some of the 
fraudulently-obtained refunds, including from Alexander. 
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power of her employment at the IRS to induce Alexander to 
pay her in exchange for filing a false claim with the IRS.  
Inducement is not an element of Hobbs Act extortion under 
color of official right.  Evans, 504 U.S. at 256; Urban, 404 
F.3d at 768; Antico, 275 F.3d at 256.  Accordingly, we affirm 
Fountain’s conviction.5 
 B. The District Court’s Guidelines    
  Determinations    
 Fountain, Ishmael, and Johnson each challenge the 
District Court’s calculation of the applicable Guidelines range 
for their sentence.  Where an objection is preserved at 
sentencing, we exercise plenary review of a district court’s 
interpretation of the Guidelines but review its factual findings 
for clear error.  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (en banc).  If the facts underlying a Guidelines 
determination are not in dispute, “but the issue is whether the 
agreed-upon set of facts fit within the enhancement 
requirements,” we review the District Court’s application of 
the enhancement for clear error.  United States v. Fish, 731 
F.3d 277, 279 (3d Cir. 2013).  Finally, where an objection is 
not preserved at sentencing, we review that challenge for 
plain error.  United States v. Couch, 291 F.3d 251, 252-53 (3d 
Cir. 2002); United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 206 (3d 
Cir. 2001).   
  1. Sophisticated Means Enhancements 
                                              
 5 Because we conclude the evidence supports 
Fountain’s conviction for the completed offense, we need not 
consider the Government’s alternative contention that the 
evidence supported a conviction of attempted extortion. 
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   a. Fountain and Johnson 
 Fountain and Johnson both argue that the District 
Court erred in applying a two-level enhancement for 
sophisticated means to their sentences under U.S.S.G. § 
2B1.1 because there was nothing particularly sophisticated 
about the means employed in their schemes.  Their arguments 
are unpersuasive.   
While the Application Notes to § 2B1.1 suggest that 
the use of “fictitious entities, corporate shells, or offshore 
financial accounts” would constitute sophisticated means,6 an 
offense can easily warrant the sophisticated means 
enhancement absent the use of those tactics.  See United 
States v. Jennings, 711 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2013) 
                                              
6 See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B) (“‘[S]ophisticated 
means’ means especially complex or especially intricate 
offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of 
an offense.  For example, in a telemarketing scheme, locating 
the main office of the scheme in one jurisdiction but locating 
soliciting operations in another jurisdiction ordinarily 
indicates sophisticated means.  Conduct such as hiding assets 
or transactions, or both, through the use of fictitious entities, 
corporate shells, or offshore financial accounts also ordinarily 
indicates sophisticated means.”); id. § 2T1.1 cmt. n.5 
(explaining similar factors for applying the sophisticated 
means enhancement for tax fraud offenses); see also id. § 
2T1.1 cmt. background (“Although tax offenses always 
involve some planning, unusually sophisticated efforts to 
conceal the offense decrease the likelihood of detection and 
therefore warrant an additional sanction for deterrence 
purposes.”). 
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(upholding a sophisticated means enhancement in the absence 
of corporate shells or offshore accounts, and explaining that 
“the list contained in the application note is not exhaustive,” 
and that “the enhancement properly applies to conduct less 
sophisticated than the list articulated in the application note”); 
see also Fish, 731 F.3d at 280 (holding that the existence of 
one of the facts listed in the application note is not necessary 
to a determination that an offense employed sophisticated 
means).   
Determining whether a defendant employed 
sophisticated means can involve considering factors like the 
duration of a scheme, the number of participants, the use of 
multiple accounts, and efforts to avoid detection.  See Fish, 
731 F.3d at 280.  Ultimately, a sophisticated means 
enhancement is appropriate where a defendant’s conduct 
“shows a greater level of planning or concealment than a 
typical fraud of its kind.”  United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 
288, 315 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Landwer, 
640 F.3d 769, 771 (7th Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation mark 
omitted).   
The enhancement was clearly appropriate here.  
Fountain identified IRS programs that would pay substantial 
sums and then designed a scheme to maximize her payout 
while avoiding detection.  In finding that she employed 
sophisticated means, the District Court pointed specifically to 
Fountain’s use of inside knowledge of the IRS’s enforcement 
thresholds, including that TETR claims under $1,500 would 
not be flagged for review.  Fountain took steps to conceal her 
identity even from others involved in the scheme, employing 
third parties to recruit claimants and collect their fees so she 
could avoid any contact with them.  Additionally, Fountain 
developed an enforcement mechanism to ensure her fees were 
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paid: submitting amended returns that tipped off the IRS 
when claimants were reluctant to pay her.  Fountain’s choice 
to use the IRS as her enforcer further decreased the likelihood 
that claimants would report her, as they would fear 
prosecution themselves.  In short, Fountain endowed the 
scheme with a sophisticated knowledge of IRS practices—
including some not known to the public—and an elaborate 
plan for manipulating hundreds of people.   
For his part, Johnson engaged recruiters to collect 
additional claimants and instituted additional practices to 
avoid detection.  He routed refunds into accounts that would 
not raise alarms, like the business bank accounts of various 
relatives and the estate and personal accounts of his recently-
deceased grandmother, and he used different business and 
personal addresses for the delivery and cashing of checks.  
Moreover, he electronically filed claims in such a manner that 
they could be traced only to a third party’s wireless network, 
rather than his own.   
Overall, the sophisticated means employed by 
Fountain, Johnson, and their co-conspirators (including 
Ishmael) allowed the scheme to grow to an extraordinary size 
while remaining undetected for years.  Their cunning and 
willingness to abuse Fountain’s position with the IRS clearly 
set this scheme apart from a “typical fraud of its kind.”  See 
Fumo, 655 F.3d at 315.  Their conduct led the District Judge 
to remark, at Johnson’s sentencing, that “this was as 
sophisticated a tax fraud scheme as this Judge has seen in 22 
years.”  Gov’t’s Supplemental App. 74.  In light of these 
findings, the application of sophisticated means 
enhancements to Fountain and Ishmael was not clear error. 
   b. Ishmael 
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 In the District Court, Ishmael challenged the 
sophisticated means enhancement to his sentence on the same 
grounds that Fountain and Johnson did: that the scheme, as a 
whole, did not involve sophisticated means.  Ishmael does not 
raise that argument on appeal.  Instead, he argues that the 
District Court committed procedural error under U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.3(a)(1)(B).  He points to the District Court’s statement 
during his sentencing hearing that the fraud scheme “was only 
possible because of the sophisticated means that, to be sure, 
were made possible by Ms. Fountain, not Mr. Ishmael.”  
Ishmael’s App. 151.  Ishmael contends that this statement 
indicates that the District Court attributed Fountain’s 
sophisticated means to Ishmael and that it erred by doing so 
without finding that Fountain’s use of those means was 
reasonably foreseeable to Ishmael.  He asks us to remand for 
resentencing so the District Court can make this finding.7 
 Ishmael argues that our decision in United States v. 
Collado, 975 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1992), compels us to remand 
for the District Court to make a finding of reasonable 
                                              
7 Because Ishmael did not raise this objection in the 
District Court, the Government argues that we should apply 
plain error review.  Ishmael counters that our decision in 
United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(en banc), does not apply retroactively, and, accordingly, that 
we should review for an abuse of discretion.  We conclude 
that Ishmael’s challenge fails even if we do review for an 
abuse of discretion, and we thus need not decide whether his 
challenge should be subject to plain error review. 
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foreseeability.8  To the contrary, Collado indicates that we 
may conduct our own review of the record to see if it supports 
a finding of reasonable foreseeability.  See Collado, 975 F.2d 
at 997.  If we are convinced that the attribution of Fountain’s 
sophisticated means is firmly supported by the record, there is 
“no reason to remand this case only to have the district court 
reach the same sentencing decision.”  United States v. Duliga, 
204 F.3d 97, 101 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000).      
 Here, it is clear that the sophisticated means Fountain 
employed were reasonably foreseeable to Ishmael.  Fountain 
and Ishmael lived together and had children together.  The 
evidence established that Ishmael knew about the IRS’s 
$1,500 threshold for flagging TETR claims for review, and 
that he knew that Fountain would reverse claimants’ refunds 
if they did not pay her fee.  Moreover, the District Court 
found that Ishmael was “the engine that drove [the] 
conspiracy from one that might have involved a handful of 
phony tax refunds to one that involved hundreds at a cost of 
over $2 million to the United States treasury,” and that 
Ishmael’s leadership “succeeded in spreading [the] scheme 
like wild fire.”  Ishmael’s App. 163.  Thus, we are convinced 
that a finding of reasonable foreseeability is firmly supported 
                                              
 8 Although Collado dealt with the inclusion of drug 
quantities dealt by co-conspirators in a defendant’s base 
offense level calculation, also known as “accomplice 
attribution,” rather than a sophisticated means enhancement, 
the same “reasonably foreseeable” standard applies to each 
inquiry, as both are guided by § 1B1.3.  See United States v. 
Anobah, 734 F.3d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Crosgrove, 637 F.3d 646, 666 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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by the record, and we affirm the District Court’s application 
of the sophisticated means enhancement to Ishmael. 
  2. Fountain’s Enhancement for Using a  
   Minor 
 Fountain argues that the District Court erred in 
applying a two-level enhancement for using a minor to 
commit her offenses under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4.  The evidence 
established, however, that Fountain used her minor daughter 
to collect payments that had been given to Witherspoon on at 
least one occasion.  Fountain counters that her use of her 
daughter cannot support the enhancement because by the time 
she had her daughter collect payments, the crime was 
complete, as Fountain had already filed the false returns.9  
But the focus of a court’s inquiry under § 3B1.4 “is on the 
actions and intent of the defendant.  Whether the minor 
himself engaged in any criminal actions, whether the minor 
intended to assist in the adult’s criminal activity, or whether 
the minor even knew that the adult was involved in criminal 
activity are factors irrelevant to application of the § 3B1.4 
enhancement.”  United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 464-
65 (2d Cir. 2004) (collecting cases).  Moreover, the crime 
continued after the filing of returns, as collecting payment, 
which occurred after filing, was the whole point of the 
scheme.  Further, the evidence indicates that Fountain and her 
co-conspirators continued filing false returns after Fountain 
                                              
 9 The Government notes that Fountain did not raise 
this argument in the District Court, and argues that it should 
be reviewed for plain error as a result.  Because we conclude 
that the District Court committed no error in applying the 
enhancement, we need not decide which standard applies. 
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had her daughter pick up payments from Witherspoon.  Thus, 
the imposition of this enhancement was not clear error. 
  3. Johnson’s Leadership Role   
   Enhancement 
 Johnson argues that the District Court erred in 
applying a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) 
because the record lacks evidence that Johnson was a leader 
or organizer.  To support this enhancement, the evidence must 
show that Johnson exercised some degree of control over at 
least one other person involved in the offense.  United States 
v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2000).  The 
evidence indicated that Johnson recruited his father and a 
friend named Andre Bruce to participate in the AOTC and 
FTHBC schemes, and that Johnson’s father eventually 
became a recruiter for Johnson and would withdraw money 
for him after the IRS issued refunds.  Johnson also directed 
Bruce to destroy evidence while Johnson was on pre-trial 
release.  Thus, the District Court did not clearly err in 
imposing this enhancement. 
  4. Johnson’s Loss Calculation 
Johnson also argues that in calculating the loss 
attributable to him, the District Court improperly included 
losses that overstate his criminal conduct and were not 
reasonably foreseeable to him.  It is well-settled that a 
sentencing court need only make a “reasonable estimate” of 
loss that is based on the available evidence in the record, 
United States v. Tupone, 442 F.3d 145, 156 (3d Cir. 2006), 
and it is clear the District Court did so here.   
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Johnson’s arguments fail upon a review of the 
Government’s loss methodology, which the District Court 
approved when it adopted the most conservative of the 
Government’s proposed loss calculations.  Johnson argues 
that the District Court erred by attributing all fraudulent tax 
returns to him, but the District Court did not do so.  In fact, 
the Government did not ask the District Judge to do so.  
Along the same lines, Johnson argues he was improperly held 
responsible for returns filed from Fountain’s IRS computer 
and for claims filed before he joined the conspiracy or after 
he left.  The Government, however, excluded those amounts 
from its calculations.  Further, Johnson argues that Bruce, not 
he, was responsible for returns filed from Bruce’s IP address.  
But the District Court and the jury already rejected this 
argument based on Bruce’s trial testimony.  Thus, attributing 
those amounts to Johnson at sentencing was not clear error.   
Finally, Johnson argues that the District Court 
improperly attributed to Johnson losses from the TETR and 
FTHBC conspiracies that were not reasonably foreseeable to 
him.  In light of Johnson’s role in recruiting claimants and 
allowing the use of his address and bank account in the TETR 
scheme and his leadership in the FTHBC scheme, the District 
Judge’s inclusion of those amounts as reasonably foreseeable 
losses was not clear error. 
In sum, the District Court arrived at a reasonable 
estimate of the loss amount attributable to Johnson by 
adopting the Government’s conservative calculation.  As 
such, we will not disturb the District Court’s findings on 
appeal. 
C. Reasonableness of Fountain and Johnson’s  
  Sentences 
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Fountain and Johnson both argue that their sentences 
were procedurally and substantively unreasonable.  We 
review a criminal sentence for an abuse of discretion and 
proceed in two stages.  United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 
152 (3d Cir. 2011).  First, we review for procedural error, 
including failure to give meaningful consideration to a 
defendant’s arguments or the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a).  Id.  Second, if there is no such error, we review for 
substantive reasonableness, and “we will affirm [the 
sentence] unless no reasonable sentencing court would have 
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 
the reasons the district court provided.”  Id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 
(3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Sentences that fall within the applicable Guidelines range are 
more likely to be reasonable than those that do not.  United 
States v. Woronowicz, 744 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 1. Fountain’s Sentence 
Fountain contends the District Court committed 
procedural error by placing undue weight on the Guidelines 
and on deterrence interests while minimizing the offender-
specific considerations in this case, including that she was a 
first-time offender and the sole caregiver of four children, one 
of whom received a terminal medical diagnosis during the 
course of this prosecution.  But the District Court gave 
adequate consideration to all of these factors, finding they 
were not “sufficiently extraordinary” to warrant a variance, 
and noted that they did not deter Fountain from her 
“egregious and protracted criminality.”  Fountain’s App. 
1008-09. 
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Fountain’s argument ultimately amounts to a challenge 
of substantive unreasonableness, as a complaint that a district 
court’s choice of sentence did not afford certain factors 
enough weight “is a substantive complaint, not a procedural 
one.”  United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 217 (3d Cir. 
2010); see also United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 546 
(3d Cir. 2007) (“Nor do we find that a district court’s failure 
to give mitigating factors the weight a defendant contends 
they deserve renders the sentence unreasonable.”).  As such, 
notwithstanding the tragic circumstances facing Fountain’s 
family, Fountain cannot meet her heavy burden of showing 
that a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range was 
substantively unreasonable in light of the sophisticated nature 
of her crimes, her lack of remorse, her abuse of her position 
with the IRS, and the need to deter other public employees 
from taking advantage of sensitive information. 
 2. Johnson’s Sentence 
Johnson argues the District Court committed 
procedural error by cutting off his counsel’s arguments at his 
sentencing hearing.  But the District Judge merely declined to 
allow Johnson’s attorney to cite an additional case in support 
of his sophisticated means objection.  The District Judge only 
did so, moreover, after noting that all of Johnson’s objections 
had been briefed ad nauseam.  Thus, we find no abuse of 
discretion in that decision.  Johnson also contends the District 
Court erred in treating a sentence within the applicable 
Guidelines range as presumptively correct, and by failing to 
address some of Johnson’s arguments at sentencing.  This 
contention, however, ignores the protracted exchange 
between the District Judge and Johnson’s counsel on the 
question of whether to grant a departure or variance.  The 
District Court also heard allocution from Johnson himself.  
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On the whole, Johnson cannot show the District Court failed 
to give meaningful consideration to any of his arguments or 
any sentencing factor, nor can he show any other procedural 
error.   
Finally, given the District Court’s findings that 
Johnson grew from a relatively small player in the TETR 
scheme to a major player in the conspiracy associated with 
the FTHBC and the AOTC, that he continued to commit 
offenses while he was on pretrial release, and that he failed to 
appreciate the magnitude of his crimes, Johnson cannot show 
that a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range was 
substantively unreasonable. 
III. Conclusion 
 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
